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Foreword | A multifaceted strategy is 
required to effectively combat organised 
crime. A key element of preventing and 
responding to organised criminal 
activity is to target how individuals 
become involved in illicit activities and 
to develop effective methods of 
preventing their recruitment. 
Using prior research into the methods 
used by organised crime groups to 
identify potential targets or confederates, 
and individuals’ motivations to seek or 
agree to participate in criminal activity, a 
framework is presented that identified key 
recruitment pathways together with some 
strategies that would make recruitment 
and engagement less effective.
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The essential components  of an organised crime group are defined in article 2 of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a structured group of three 
or more persons, existing for a period of time, acting in concert with the aim of committing 
serious criminal offences in order to obtain some financial or material benefit (United Nations 
2004). As such, organised crime requires three or more persons to come together for 
the execution of their common purpose. This paper examines the processes involved in 
recruitment and the opportunities and incentives that make participation in organised crime 
attractive for suitably motivated individuals. Armed with a sophisticated understanding of 
how recruitment takes place, it is possible to develop appropriate intervention strategies 
that would seek to disrupt recruitment pathways and to make it difficult for organised crime 
groups to secure the services of potential collaborators.
Considerable research has been undertaken into the daily activities of organised crime 
groups, including how they fund their operations, maintain control over communities and 
launder the proceeds of their criminal enterprises. Organised crime groups in Australia 
include outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs; Holmes 2007; Lozusic 2002), ethnic-based 
crime groups, family-based crime groups and groups formed on the basis of place of 
origin such as prisons (CCC WA 2005). The Australian Crime Commission has noted that: 
although most organised crime activities in Australia are focused on illicit drug markets, 
organised crime is increasingly diversifying its activities, with convergences being observed 
between legitimate or licit markets and illicit markets (ACC 2013: 7).
Organised crime exists on a continuum of seriousness and complexity of activity as shown 
in Figure 1. At the lower end of seriousness are instances of small-scale street crime 
committed by small groups of individuals, often young people or family members who 
become involved in low-level property or violent crime. Small groups of individuals 
can also commit economic crimes such as small business-related revenue fraud. Other 
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criminal networks are involved in organised 
cybercrime and online consumer scams 
that are coordinated entirely online (Choo & 
Smith 2008). Organised criminal activities 
are also linked to environmental crime, 
intellectual property infringement, maritime 
piracy and financial crime, which require 
the presence of multiple players in order for 
offences to be planned and perpetrated.
Arguably, at the most serious level are 
large-scale, organised criminal activities 
related to child exploitation, human 
trafficking, corporate fraud and illicit 
drug production and supply. Large-scale 
terrorist activity can also entail extensive 
organisation and planning.
The extent of co-offending
At the outset, it is important to understand 
the extent to which serious crime is carried 
out collaboratively, as the pathways of 
recruitment will differ depending on the 
number of individuals involved and the 
complexity of their relationships. Recruiting 
two individuals to carry out a major fraud 
within a bank is substantively different from 
the recruitment of 50 skilled participants 
to conduct a major drug production and 
distribution network.
Research carried out by the Australian Institute 
of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Smith 2003) found that out of 155 case files 
involving serious fraud in Australia and New 
Zealand, 84 percent had only one accused 
person involved, and in only 11 case files (7%) 
were more than two persons involved (Smith 
2003). This finding contradicts the view that 
a high proportion of serious economic crime 
is perpetrated by criminal organisations. The 
study in question, however, examined only 
successfully detected serious fraud and it 
could be the case that organised crime is 
involved in other matters that do not come to 
the attention of the authorities.
More recently, KPMG (2013) reported an 
increase in the proportion of serious fraud 
cases involving more than two offenders 
acting together between its 2010 and 
2012 fraud surveys. In 2010, 23 percent 
of internal fraud involved collusion (KPMG 
2010), while in 2012 this increased to 29 
percent (KPMG 2013). The percentage of 
cases of internal fraud involving four or more 
persons increased from two percent in 2010 
to six percent in 2012 (KPMG 2013, 2010). 
The vast majority of serious fraud reported 
in the surveys was, however, perpetrated 
by individuals acting alone.





• Serious financial crime
• Small-scale business fraud and tax evasion
• Family-based local crime
• Small-scale street crime
Seriousness
• Organised cybercrime and scams
• Organised environmental crime
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Theoretical approaches
Criminological theory provides a number 
of insights into the processes through 
which crime is commissioned. Edwin 
Sutherland’s (1939) theory of differential 
association, for example, that was 
developed in the late 1930s in the United 
States to explain juvenile gang behaviour, 
proposed that criminal behaviour is learned 
through a process of social interaction 
between individuals in which they learn 
how to commit crimes and to justify their 
illegal conduct (Sutherland 1939). He 
argued that if the conditions favourable 
to acting illegally outweigh the frequency 
and intensity of conditions unfavourable 
to violating the law, then an individual is 
more likely to decide to break the law 
(Sutherland & Cressey 1974). Sutherland 
(1937) developed the theory drawing on 
his classic study, The Professional Thief, 
in which he analysed and described 
ethnographically the life and daily routines 
of professional thieves in the United States.
More recently, Derek Cornish (1994) 
developed the notion of ‘crime scripts’ 
to understand the processes by which 
criminals conduct their activities. Research 
of this kind has been applied in relation to 
the resale of stolen vehicles (Tremblay, Talon 
& Hurley 2001), cheque forgery (Lacoste 
& Tremblay 2003) and organised crime 
(Hancock & Laycock 2010).
Crime scripts, according to Cornish (1994: 
161) are a sequence of ‘script functions’ and 
accompanying ‘script actions’ that organise 
our knowledge and understanding of routine 
behavioural processes. In the present 
context, these relate to the identification and 
engagement of co-offenders who can be 
encouraged to join in the illegal activity.
The recruitment of a third party to commit 
a crime can be broken down into a number 
of routine processes. These include 
preconditions, initiation, actualisation, 
doing and post-conditions, and these 
script functions have corresponding script 
actions (Cornish 1994). By developing 
an understanding of how organised 
crime groups may seek to recruit new 
members, a script analysis can then be 
used to identify the script functions and 
corresponding actions.
This paper explores the processes by which 
recruitment for organised crime takes place 
from the perspectives of:
• existing members of organised crime 
groups seeking out new members to 
facilitate proposed criminal activities 
(recruiter pathways); and
• environmental opportunities, which 
make participation in organised crime 
attractive for previously law abiding 
citizens (recruitee pathways).
Research evidence and anecdotal 
illustrations of identified pathways are 
drawn from a number of ethnographic 
studies of organised crime published in 
the academic literature. These include 
Dick Hobbs’s Lush Life (2013), which 
explored organised crime in ‘Dogtown’, 
a composite of various East London 
communities that he examined and Jan 
Goldstraw-White’s (2012) work for which 
she interviewed 41 incarcerated white-
collar offenders in the United Kingdom. 
Organised financial crime has also been 
studied extensively by Mike Levi (2008) in 
his interview-based research into long-
firm fraud (planned bankruptcies); while 
in 2007 the consultancy firm, Matrix 
Knowledge Group (2007), carried out a 
study of 222 convicted drug traffickers 
for the Home Office in the report The Illicit 
Drug Trade in the United Kingdom.
Research has also been conducted at the 
Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime 
and Law Enforcement at the Research and 
Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry 
of Security and Justice in particular, research 
supporting the Organized Crime Monitor that 
examined 1,092 organised crime offenders 
including in-depth interviews with inmates 
convicted of participation in organised 
crime and incarcerated in Dutch prisons 
(Kleemans & De Poot 2008; Van Koppen 
2012; Van Koppen & De Poot 2013).
In the United States, Adler and Adler 
(1983) spent six years observing and 
interviewing 65 upper-level marijuana and 
cocaine traffickers and their associates in 
south-western California, and examining 
their typical career paths. They noted how 
‘potential recruits are lured into the drug 
business by materialism, hedonism, glamor, 
and excitement’ (Adler & Adler 1983: 206).
Diego Gambetta’s Codes of the Underworld 
(2009) also provides an extensive analysis 
of how organised criminals communicate 
with each other, and use signals and 
intimidation to support their activities, while 
Carlo Morselli’s Contacts, Opportunities 
and Criminal Enterprise (2005) provides 
a social network analysis of a number of 
case studies of criminal organisations taken 
from Canadian police operations (see also 
Morselli 2009).
In Australia, Arthur Veno, in his book The 
Brotherhoods (2012) presents the results 
of his ethnographic study of bikie gangs in 
Australia over 27 years; while in the United 
States, Robert Mazur in The Infiltrator (2009) 
gives an account of his five years’ undercover 
work for the FBI infiltrating the criminal 
hierarchy of Colombia’s drug cartels.
These are clearly only a small selection of 
the published literature on organised crime, 
but they provide firsthand, ethnographic 
accounts of recruitment practices in various 
organised crime contexts, which are relevant 
illustrations of the processes identified in 
this paper. Generally, there has been little 
specific research on recruitment processes, 
apart from one doctoral dissertation that 
presented an economic model of how 
government policies can affect membership 
patterns among organised crime groups 
(Long 2013).
Some caution, however, needs to be 
exercised when trying to fit the results 
of prior ethnographic research into a set 
of predetermined categories. In many 
respects, organised criminal activity is far 
from organised and as Dick Hobbs (2013: 5) 
rightly observes:
criminal collaborations generate chaotic 
sets of personal and commercial 
affiliations featuring fluid and often 
unpredictable interchanges that are 
ill suited to the sociometric analysis 
favoured by police and police science.
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Recruitment pathways
With this admonition in mind, certain 
pathways in which organised crime 
recruitment occurs can begin to be 
identified. Pathways can be examined 
from the points of view of those who 
are seeking to recruit new members to 
become involved in criminal enterprises 
(recruiter pathways) and those who may 
be the targets of recruitment initiatives 
(recruitee pathways). Often, recruitees 
are individuals without prior criminal 
connections who are seeking to raise 
funds in order to maintain their lifestyle or 
to consort with established crime figures 
for various reasons, as explained below. 
The pathways to recruitment also vary 
according to the organisational structure 
displayed by the group in question—be it 
hierarchically based, network-based, or 
via more diffuse, loose arrangements (see 
UNODC 2002). Having centralised control 
can often make recruitment activities more 
targeted and efficient, while unstructured 
groups, such as those that exist online, 
often recruit in an ad hoc manner.
Recruiter pathways
Established members of organised crime 
groups seek out new members for a variety 
of reasons including the skillsets they offer, 
which might facilitate criminal activities such 
as the manufacture of illicit drugs or the 
counterfeiting of payment cards; their ability 
to use violence and intimidation, which 
crime bosses might not wish to undertake 
themselves; skills they possess in facilitating 
the laundering of the proceeds of crime; 
and their willingness to engage in high-risk 
activities involving weapons or explosives 
or other activities likely to lead to arrest. 
In addition, organised crime groups can 
seek to establish relationships with those 
in influential government positions who can 
assist in facilitating the flow of information 
or decisions relevant to proposed criminal 
activities. The case of ‘Ron’, a drug courier 
manager, is an example of how organised 
crime can seek to recruit otherwise law-
abiding individuals (see Box 1).
Box 1 Recruitment of drug couriers
Ron was in his mid-50s and had been retired from 
his job in law enforcement for a decade when he 
first became involved in the drug trade. Ron 
managed an operation based on couriers importing 
cocaine into the United Kingdom from Granada and 
his role was to recruit and manage the couriers. He 
frequented a local casino where he spotted potential 
couriers from among the casino’s clientele, tending 
to target white, middle-aged men, low on money 
and ‘who needed a holiday’. Ron made all the travel 
arrangements, purchased the airline tickets, 
provided the suitcase and handed over the spending 
money…The couriers would have their holiday and 
return with an identical suitcase containing cocaine. 
On the successful arrival of a consignment into the 
United Kingdom, Ron would collect the case from 
the courier at the airport and hand the drugs over to 
his bosses, who would be waiting in a nearby 
carpark. The boss would pay Ron £12,000 in cash, 
which was £7,000 for the courier (who had also had 
a 2 week holiday) and £5,000 for Ron. Matrix 
Knowledge Group  in Hobbs (2013: 242).
Recruitee pathways
Pathways can also be understood from the 
perspective of those who are the subject of 
recruitment. Otherwise law-abiding citizens 
may seek to become involved in criminal 
enterprises for a variety of reasons. They 
might need funds to satisfy debts or lifestyle 
expenditure, they may have a desire to 
enhance their financial or social standing 
or they might demonstrate an interest in 
risk-taking activities, or possess motivations 
based in pathological psychological 
processes (Hobbs 2013; Kleemans & De 
Poot 2008; KPMG 2013). Rather than 
commence criminal activities in isolation, 
they might seek out known criminals who 
could be seen to assist in their proposed 
course of action. The case of ‘Billy’, a used 
car dealer, is illustrative of such a person 
(see Box 2).
Crime scripts of recruitment
Hancock and Laycock (2010) have applied 
Cornish’s (1994) approach to analysing 
criminal behaviour through the use of crime 
scripts to the disruption of organised crime 
and identified recruitment as one area 
where disruption might have potential. The 
present discussion identifies three main 
stages in the recruitment process as—
target identification, establishing trust and 
engaging in compliance, and enforcement 
script actions.
Target identification
One of the initial tasks that both recruiters 
and the targets of their recruitment have to 
undertake is the identification of willing and 
cooperative collaborators. This activity is 
fraught with risk as identifying participants 
for criminal activity can, itself, be criminal 
and can also lead to threats of, or actual 
violence, being inflicted.
Identification by recruiters
Potential criminals are able to be sourced 
from many occupational and other groups 
in society, largely based on their interests 
and the skills they possess. This can include 
those with experience in telemarketing who 
can participate in boiler-room investment 
fraud (ACC 2012), ex-military personnel who 
have experience in the use of weapons and 
explosives, and members of the public willing 
to act as drug or money mules. On other 
occasions, organised crime groups may 
seek out those working in the professions 
such as lawyers and accountants who can 
assist in laundering the proceeds of crime or 
in establishing corporate entities and other 
vehicles for use in tax evasion (see Choo et 
al. 2012).
Box 2 Recruitment of a used car dealer
Billy was a successful car dealer and nightclub 
owner, and had also made money from an 
expanding property portfolio before he was 
introduced to a group of drug importers who were 
contemplating how to invest their profits. Attracted 
by the prospect of easy money, Billy fed these profits 
through his car dealership and progressed to 
become a ‘middle man’, seeking out buyers for the 
drug importers. Eventually, he ran the enterprise, 
becoming embroiled with the day-to-day workings of 
a large operation consisting of storers, mixers, 
testers and legitimate professionals, many of whom 
were paid a salary. Billy also courted the friendship 
of police officers who, in exchange for free drinks, 
would provide him with information and carry out 
background checks on business associates and 
employees. Matrix Knowledge Group in Hobbs 
(2013: 241).
Those working in the information technology 
and security industries also have attractive 
skills that organised crime can use. The 
other productive location for recruitment is 
the public sector, particularly those working 
in law enforcement, border control, intelligence 
and corrections. Rowe et al. (2013) provide 
examples of recent instances in which public 
servants in Australia have been recruited by 
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organised crime to provide access to law 
enforcement intelligence through a range of 
corrupt practices.
Prisons, in particular, provide many 
opportunities for inmates to establish 
ties with other offenders, sometimes 
individuals with low-level convictions who 
can be recruited into more serious criminal 
enterprises both while incarcerated, as 
well as after their release (see Box 3). 
Prison recruitment also carries the benefit 
that everyone involved can be assured 
that those whom they approach have 
criminal records sufficient to warrant a 
term of imprisonment.
Identification by recruitees
Arguably, a more difficult task exists for 
those in the law-abiding community who 
wish to become involved in organised 
crime. One cannot simply approach 
people who appear to be criminal and 
seek membership of an illegal organisation. 
Some traditional organised crime 
groups are clearly recognisable, such 
as the Yakuza with their tattooed bodies 
(Adelstein 2010), or OMCGs with their club 
colours and patches (Veno 2012). Even 
if individuals are recognisably members 
of a criminal enterprise, there may still be 
many procedures that they are required to 
undertake in order to establish trust and to 
secure membership.
Diego Gambetta (2009) has explored 
in detail the use of non-verbal cues to 
facilitate identification of those involved 
in criminal enterprises and notes how the 
use of language and behavioural cues can 
facilitate covert introductions in ways that 
do not attract attention from authorities 
or others who may be disposed to report 
what transpires to the police. Subtle 
conventions in the use of language, dialect, 
dress and behaviour are used to ensure 
that trust and legitimacy in the criminal 
enterprise are guaranteed.
Serendipitous identification
Finally, identification of potential criminal 
collaborators may take place accidentally 
or inadvertently through contact that 
occurs in common meeting places such 
as pubs, casinos, gyms, brothels and 
internet sites. Often, these are places at 
which individuals with either law-abiding or 
criminal orientations meet, establish social 
relationships and begin the process of 
criminal collaboration. Similarly, unplanned 
recruitment can also arise within extended 
families such as has been documented 
in the case of Mafia families (Tyler 1971), 
while more recently, social media have 
provided abundant ways in which people 
with common interests can establish 
relationships—both for legitimate and 
illegal purposes (Choo & Smith 2008).
On occasions, organised crime groups 
have simply advertised online for new 
recruits such as the following (unedited) 
online invitation for people to undertake 
credit card skimming operations:
We are private organisation for your 
special developing requests. We are 
focused at Electronic and Computer 
Engineering. If you need special 
hardwares (especially hi-tech) nor 
software that can not be done or even 
discuss in your Country because of 
any reason such as laws etc. then 
u are at the very right place. We are 
offering absolutely anonymous & 
offshore developing for your projects. 
We don’t care what you want to do 
with hardwares and softwares you 
requested to be done by us. Needless 
to say, your privacy is very important for 
us and we don’t share with anyone else 
because of any reason. We don’t need 
your Name, Adress etc. because of any 
reason. We only need your email. You 
will have a certificate and account for 
secure login to our private forum for 
tracking your development, you even 
may ask question to engineers who 
engineering your project. If you reach 
this Web Site then you already know us. 
We are not cheap developers and we 
cant make partnership with you. If you 
wish your dreams to come true then u 
have to have enough money to invest 
for your dreams. You even have to pay 
for request for quote from us for your 
project (Glenny 2011: 203–204).
Such online advertising for willing recruits 
is also prevalent in connection with online 
consumer scams such as work-from-home 
scams and online romance and dating 
fraud. Although increasing in sophistication, 
many such invitations are barely credible 
and yet continue to trick unsuspecting 
individuals into participation (Jorna & 
Hutchings 2013).
Box 3 Recruitment in correctional settings
Karl was a former accountant who was serving a 
term of imprisonment for tax fraud in Western 
Australia. While in prison, he was approached by 
another prisoner who needed his assistance in order 
to obtain funds from the Tax Office. The accountant 
assisted him, but later found out that the claim was 
not legitimate. He was then approached by other 
prisoners who asked him to prepare false income 
tax returns with false business details and other 
fabricated evidence. Over a period of a year he filed 
210 fraudulent tax returns on behalf of 125 fellow 
prisoners in which fraudulent tax refunds, amounting 
to almost $1.3m were claimed. A total of half a 
million dollars was refunded by the Tax Office to the 
prisoners. Karl administered the scheme using a 
computer for online banking and mobile phone and 
received $61,000 in commissions and fees over the 
12 month period. He argued that he was forced to 
carry out the scheme under duress, but was 
sentenced to an additional two years with a 
non-parole period of 12 months. [2002] WASC 265 
(CCA, 20 September 2002).
A further example of serendipitous 
recruitment in the Netherlands concerned a 
former truck driver who had set up a café to 
be able to spend more time with his family 
and who was recruited into transporting 
heroin for an organised crime group through 
contacts he had with a group of customers 
at his café. This provides a clear example 
of how routine activities can facilitate the 
recruitment process (Felson & Clarke 1998). 
The café owner was eventually sentenced to 
12 years’ imprisonment for heroin trafficking 
(Van Koppen & De Poot 2013). He explained 
how he became involved as follows:
You start talking and ask each other: 
‘What did you do before and where do 
you come from?’ That’s the first thing 
you do. And when I mentioned I’d been 
a truck driver for years, that triggered 
something of course. He should know 
people, maybe he wants to. But I never 
wanted to [. . .] I wasn’t interested at 
all. I did not need the money and did 
not bite, it did not fascinate me. After 
some months, however…After all, 
they are your frequent customers and 
you talk to them all the time. There 
comes a time it goes through your mind 
that some others you know have the 
ability to and probably want to do it. At 
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first I thought: I’ll do them both a favour 
and I can earn some additional money, 
you know. I really did not see the danger in 
doing it (Van Koppen & De Poot 2013: 82).
Adler and Adler (1983) also found instances 
of serendipitous recruitment in which law-
abiding individuals gradually became involved 
in drug trafficking in order to make use of 
their skills or to enhance their income (see 
Box 4).
Box 4 Recruitment into money laundering
I used to be into real estate making good money. I 
was the only person at my firm renting to longhairs 
and dealing with their money. I slowly started getting 
friendly with them, although I didn’t realize how 
heavy they were. I knew ways of buying real estate 
and putting it under fictitious names, laundering 
money so that it went in as hot cash and came out 
as spendable income. I slowly got more and more 
involved with this one guy until I was neglecting my 
real estate business and just partying with him all 
the time. My spending went up but my income went 
down and suddenly I had to look around for another 
way to make money fast. I took the money I was 
laundering for him, bought some bricks from another 
dealer friend of his and sold them out of state before 
I gave him back the cash. Within six months I was 
turning [selling] 100 bricks at a time (Adler & Adler 
1983: 198).
Establishing trust
Establishing trust and confidence that the 
person with whom one is dealing is not 
an undercover police officer, or someone 
likely to blow the whistle, is often a lengthy 
and invasive operation both for organised 
criminals and those whom they are seeking 
to recruit. In many cases, this can entail 
initiation tasks such as demonstrating 
criminal skills, providing samples of actual 
criminal conduct (particularly the use of 
violence) and showing a willingness to 
share confidential information with other 
group members.
In the case of online organised crime 
groups engaged in sharing child exploitation 
material, it is often the case that recruits 
need to supply extensive libraries of illegal 
exploitation images in order to establish 
their bona fides and to gain access to group 
libraries of similar material (Choo & Smith 
2008; Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell 2011).
Establishing trust in the online criminal 
world can also require the use of various 
anonymising and security technologies. 
In particular, it is important to ensure that 
one’s true identity is not revealed and so 
aliases and false identities are invariably 
used when logging on to illicit websites. 
Security of data is also required and 
organised crime groups now make use 
of encryption, steganography, biometrics 
and Tor software that reduces the risk 
of online activities being monitored by 
law enforcement. Some organised crime 
groups also require identity verification both 
during enrolment and when undergoing 
regular checks designed to confirm trust 
and security of group members. An 
example exists in the case of OMCGs 
(Lozusic 2002).
Trust also needs to be maintained during 
the early stages of group membership and 
tests are often used to demonstrate an 
absence of risk, proof of veracity and loyalty 
to the organisation. Occasionally this can 
entail involvement in successful criminal 
operations to demonstrate skills and in the 
case of unsuccessful activities, willingness 
to be convicted and serve prison time.
Compliance and reinforcement
Further proof of commitment to the cause 
may require financial investment in the 
organisation and successful recruitment of 
new members of the organisation—such as 
occurs in connection with online networks 
that share child exploitation material.
Failed recruitment
On occasions, recruitment may be 
unsuccessful and fail. This can occur 
where criminal activity is detected by 
law enforcement and new recruits are 
suspected of whistleblowing or of being 
undercover operatives (Mazur 2009). 
In the case of hierarchically organised 
networks, sanctions of escalating severity 
may be imposed leading to expulsion 
from membership, or threats of, or actual, 
violence and murder.
Intervening in recruitment 
pathways
Having explored the various pathways for 
the recruitment of individuals to engage 
in organised crime and identified the 
crime scripts associated with methods 
of recruitment, it is possible to identify 
strategies that could be considered to 
intervene in such pathways so as to make 
recruitment difficult and likely to lead to 
detection by law enforcement.
Not all of the available opportunities for 
intervention may be possible, having regard 
to privacy, human rights and legislative 
limitations on taking action. At a minimum, 
however, the ways in which recruitment 
takes place can be identified and made 
obvious and available for official scrutiny.
Table 1 summarises a number of possible 
intervention points in recruitment pathways 
that could be explored by policymakers 
seeking to control organised criminal 
activities. Although some may be difficult 
to implement, discussion of each could 
be examined as possible ways in which to 
control recruitment activities. It develops 
Hancock and Laycock’s (2010) comparable 
presentation of prevention strategies arising 
from crime script analysis that are applicable 
to organised criminal activities generally. The 
principal areas to address in connection with 
recruitment relate to the use by organised 
crime of anonymity, reliance on professional 
advisers, convenient meeting locations 
and the availability of motivated recruitees. 
There is also a need to publicise the risks 
associated with involvement in organised 
crime from the perspective of likelihood of 
arrest, confiscation of assets and physical 
harms that may be inflicted both personally 
and on friends and relatives of recruitees 
who participate in organised crime.
Addressing anonymity
First, as Hancock and Laycock (2010) rightly 
emphasised, there is a need to address the 
use of anonymity among organised crime 
groups, especially those that operate online. 
In particular, removing the ability of organised 
crime to access pre-paid information and 
communication technologies (ICT) services 
and regulating the use of anonymising 
software and encryption for illegal purposes 
would be beneficial. Further, making effective 
use of existing lawful databases of persons 
convicted organised crime could assist law 
enforcement with identification of recruitment 
activities, while enhanced data analysis of 
financial and cyber intelligence including 
associated tracking of funds transfer 
locations might be possible.
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Table 1 Potential interventions in recruitment pathways relevant to identified crime scripts
Script action Intervention category Intervention
Act anonymously under law enforcement radar Anonymity Remove anonymity afforded by access to pre-paid ICT services (mobile phones, Internet services, 
payment cards)
Regulating the use of anonymising software and encryption for illegal activities
Using intelligence databases of convicted organised criminals
Enhanced analysis of financial intelligence collected by Financial Intelligence Units
Enhanced data-matching and e-authentication procedures
Obtain professional advice on commission of 
crime and laundering of proceeds
Use of professionals Enhanced regulation of accountants and financial advisers
Enhanced regulation of ICT professionals and transport sector workers
Full compliance with FATF anti-money laundering recommendations for professional advisers
Tighter controls and identity checks on company formation
Enhanced checks on convicted organised criminals seeking to form companies
Coordination of anti-corruption measures
Improved protection of whistleblowers who report organised crime and improvement of reporting 
mechanisms
Identify places to meet Meeting locations Monitoring high-risk meeting locations
Anti-fortification laws directed at fortified organised crime club premises
Mandatory membership records for high-risk meeting locations such as gyms, fitness clubs, 
gambling venues and for sex industry proprietors
Improving the collection and sharing of prison intelligence among law enforcement and correctional 
agencies
Locate motivated recruitees Motivated recruitees Address the red flags of fraud and rationalisations for the commission of financial crime (eg 
problem gambling, excessive lifestyle expenditure with inadequate assets, small business failures)
Publicise high-risk lifestyle and fun associated 
with organised crime
Risk awareness Enact and publicise uniform unexplained wealth and assets confiscation laws
Publicise the harms associated with organised crime lifestyles (eg violence, intimidation, family 
loss, asset loss, addictions)
Publicise the cost–benefit balance associated with organised crime lifestyles
Publicise the probability of detection of serious crime and sanctions applicable to organised 
criminal activity
Enhance opportunities for lawful avenues of risk-taking activities
Regulating professional advisers
Enhanced efforts could also be made 
to ensure that financial advisers and 
accountants, in particular, are adequately 
regulated to ensure that their services 
cannot be used, overtly or unwittingly, by 
organised crime groups.
Additional controls may need to be 
developed for other occupational groups, 
such as those in the transportation and ICT 
industries. Having procedures that could 
identify high-risk individuals within these 
sectors could assist in locating red flags 
for corruption before they are acted upon. 
For example, enhanced reference checking 
for those seeking employment in trusted 
positions in the transport industry and those 
working in ICT may help to identify individuals 
who may be subject to corruption. Similarly, 
having national standards and disciplinary 
controls for those working in ICT may help to 
identify high-risk individuals.
Prohibitions could also be enforced against 
those convicted of serious crimes from 
forming companies and enhanced identity 
checks undertaken when businesses are 
being established that could be used in 
connection with organised crime. In addition, 
the use of Australia’s anti-corruption regime 
could be used to identify potential infiltration 
of government by organised crime groups 
(Rowe et al. 2013). Allied to this is the need 
to encourage reporting of serious crime and 
the protection of those who make reports in 
the public interest.
Controlling meeting places
There is compelling evidence that 
recruitment takes place in a limited 
number of high-risk locations, particularly 
prisons, pubs, fitness clubs and brothels. 
Ensuring that fit-and-proper persons’ 
tests applicable to those in charge of such 
venues are enforced might help to deter 
organised crime involvement. Similarly, 
ensuring that such businesses maintain 
accurate and verifiable records of members 
and regular users could also make some 
premises unattractive to organised crime.
Recent anti-organised crime legislative 
measures such as anti-fortification laws and 
anti-association laws could also be useful in 
ensuring that meeting places frequented by 
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organised criminals are made less desirable 
places to congregate.
Finally, when police task forces are 
targeting organised crime groups, it would 
be beneficial to focus some activity on 
increasing the probability of detection of 
organised crime groups when attempting 
to recruit new members. Improving 
prison security and further development 
of corrections agency intelligence could 
assist in disrupting recruitment activities 
that take place within prisons, while 
allowing online data monitoring—with 
judicial authorisation—would assist 
law enforcement in identifying high-risk 
recruitment environments.
Attacking recruitee motivations
Attacking the motivations for involvement 
in organised crime by otherwise law-
abiding individuals is an essential element 
in breaking pathways to recruitment.
For example, there is now an established 
awareness of the red flags of individuals 
becoming susceptible to involvement in 
serious financial crime (eg KPMG 2013), 
such as the presence of lifestyle pressures, 
gambling addiction and business failure.
An illustration of how personal financial 
difficulties led a senior public servant 
to be recruited by organised crime to 
obtain confidential intelligence for the 
group is the case of the former Assistant 
Director Investigations at the NSW Crime 
Commission who became involved with 
a drug trafficking organisation and the 
importation of 300kg of pseudoephedrine. 
His motivations for becoming involved in the 
criminal organisation were clearly financial 
gain, to clear himself of debts and to provide 
for his family. To this end, he entered into 
an agreement with an informant and a 
legitimate businessman to import a large 
quantity of pseudoephedrine concealed in 
a container of rice ([2011] NSW Supreme 
Court 1422, 8 December 2011). Had the 
NSW Crime Commission been aware of 
his financial position, his vulnerability to 
corruption could have been identified and 
perhaps prevented. Any such monitoring 
of personnel would need to comply with 
privacy and human rights protections.
There is also evidence that neutralising 
the rationalisations or justifications for 
involvement in serious crime can be an 
effective deterrent to individuals acting 
illegally (Duffield & Grabosky 2001).
Publicising risks
Making organised crime unattractive and 
unprofitable through the confiscation of 
assets and use of unexplained wealth laws 
has been identified as a key strategy in 
preventing and responding to organised 
crime (Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Law Enforcement 2012). Recent 
legislation that has sought to proscribe 
membership of organised crime groups 
could also have the indirect beneficial 
effect of deterring individuals from seeking 
to become new members of such groups 
through fear of prosecution as a member of 
a proscribed gang.
Broadhurst, Lauchs and Lohrisch (2014) 
argue, for example, that many OMCG 
members are simply motivated by a desire 
to have ‘fun’ and to engage in risk-taking. 
Publicising the negative consequences of 
criminality including the potential physical and 
mental harms, risk of imprisonment, loss of 
livelihood and involvement in addictions could 
all help to make organised crime appear to 
be an unattractive lifestyle choice.
Organised crime is a multifaceted, complex 
phenomenon and as such, requires a 
multifaceted response strategy. Initiatives 
need to be flexible and dynamic and able 
to meet changes in the nature of organised 
crime as they become apparent. A key 
element of preventing and responding to 
organised criminal activity is to interdict 
or prevent individuals being recruited into 
criminal organisations. This paper has 
identified some potential ways in which this 
may be achieved that reinforce a multifaceted 
approach to combat organised crime.
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